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Levine: California Law Survey

SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW
by Carole Levine*

This survey of California case law and legislation is a regular feature of the Women's Law Forum. The purpose of the Survey is to summarize all California Supreme Court cases, courts
of appeal cases, and legislation enacted in the past year that is
of special importance to women. The focus of the Survey is on
presenting issues most pertinent to women, rather than on analyzing all issues raised in each case or bill.
The survey period for cases in this issue is from June 1979
through February 1980. Summaries of significant legislation enacted from October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1979 are also included. We wish to thank the editors of California Women, a
Bulletin published by the California Commission on the Status
of women, for permission to reprint portions of their review of
California legislation.
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I. CRIMINAL LAW

A.

RAPE AND OTHER SEX OFFENSES

1.

Commitment Procedures for Mentally Disordered Sex
Offenders

People v. Saffell, 25 Cal. 3d 223,599 P.2d 92, 157 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1979). Defendant was convicted of rape and sexual perversion, and found to be a mentally disordered sex offender
(MDSO) amenable to treatment. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.1, he was committed to a state hospital for a period of treatment equal to the upper term for the
underlying criminal offenses, without time off for good behavior.
The California Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeal,
found that defendant was not denied equal protection of the law
even though non-MDSOs and MDSOs not amenable to treatment would have been sentenced to a shorter prison term and
allowed "good time" credit. The court reasoned that the imposition of the· upper term is necessary to further the compelling
state purposes of 1) identifying and providing medical attention
to those individuals amenable to treatment who commit sexually
motivated criminal acts, and 2) assuring the safety of the public.
The court further held that the legislative purposes underlying
the provisions for "good time" credits in a prison setting are not
necessarily suitable within a hospital setting.
People v. Compelleebee, 99 Cal. App. 3d 296, 160' Cal. Rptr.
233. (5th Dist. 1979). Mter trial, the lower court extended for
one year the commitment period of a mentally disordered sex
offender (MDSO). The court of appeal reversed, holding that the
state must demonstrate that an MDSO can benefit from treatment before a commitment extension will be granted. (Welfare
and Institutions Code section 6316.2). In the present case, the
evidence offered at trial was insufficient to support a finding
that the defendant would benefit from the extension.
2. Equal Protection Challenge to Statutory Rape Law
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P .2d 572,
159 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1979). In a four to three decision, the supreme court refused to compel the trial court to dismiss an information charging a minor with a felony violation of Penal
Code section 261.5, unlawful intercourse with a female under
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eighteen years of age. The court held that while the penal code
section does classify both victims and offenders by sex, there is a
compelling state interest in preventing teenage pregnancies that
justifies the classifications. Thus, the statute meets the equal
protection requirements of both the state and federal
constitutions.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction of Rape and Great
Bodily Injury
People v. Thomas, 96 Cal. App. 3d 507, 158 Cal. Rptr. 120
(2d Dist. 1979). Among other charges, the defendant was found
guilty of raping and inflicting great bodily injury on an unconscious woman. The evidence showed that the defendant had
been seen walking in the vicinity of the crime; the victim could
not see or identify her assailant because of the darkness; that
after fainting, she awoke to find that she had been raped, badly
bruised and had suffered a broken ankle, that the defendant had
the same blood type as the rapist; and that a sweater, found in
the defendant's car, had on it a leaf common to plants both in
the victim's and the defendant's yard. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that while the evidence was circumstantial and admittedly weak, the jury was entitled to draw
an inference of guilt. The court also held that the finding of
great bodily injury in connection with the rape charge was warranted because the victim's bruises and broken ankle had not
completely healed by the time of the trial, six months following
the offense.
People v. Hall, 95 Cal. App. 3d 299, 157 Cal. Rptr. 107 (2d
Dist. 1979). Defendant was charged with rape and forcible oral
copulation. Mter preliminary hearing, the information was
amended to include an allegation of infliction of great bodily injury. The jury found defendant guilty of all three offenses. The
court of appeal affirmed, holding that the information was properly amended because the evidence at the preliminary hearing-including testimony that the defendant struck the victim
with his fist numerous times-gave the defendant adequate notice of the allegation.
4. Admissibility of Evidence of Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct
People v. Wall, 95 Cal. App. 3d 978, 157 Cal. Rptr. 587,
Women's Law Forum
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modified on denial of rehearing, 97 Cal. App. 3d 505a (1st Dist.
1979). The defendant was convicted of rape by force and violence, and of false imprisonment. A former boyfriend of the victim testified that she had threatened to make a false accusation
of rape against him. The trial court granted the prosecution's
motion to strike the testimony, ruling that it was prohibited by
Evidence Code section 787, which provides that evidence of conduct tending to demonstrate a character trait, may not be used
to attack or support the credibility of a witness. The court of
appeal reversed, holding that the testimony of the former boyfriend was admissible under Evidence Code section 1103 subdivision 1. This subdivision authorizes the use of character trait
evidence in the form of specific instances of conduct, if offered
by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in conformity
with the character trait. The court reasoned that Evidence Code
section 1103 which is a narrow statute applicable only to criminal actions, takes precedence over section 787 which is a general
statute applicable to both civil and criminal actions.
People v. King, 94 Cal. App. 3d 696, 156 Cal. Rptr. 268 (2d
Dist. 1979). Defendants were found guilty of forcible rape, sodomy and oral copulation. The trial court refused to permit the
defendants to question the victim about the. circumstances surrounding six prior rapes she had failed to report. The court of
appeal affirmed, holding that evidence as to the circumstances of
the alleged other rapes related to the nature of the victim's prior
sexual conduct and fell within the ambit of questions proscribed
by Evidence Code section 1103 subdivision (a).
5. Governmental Immunity for Failure to Enforce Rape Laws
Graham v. City of Biggs, 96 Cal. App. 3d 250, 157 Cal. Rptr.
761 (3d Dist. 1979). Plaintiff alleged violations of her civil rights
by a city and various city officials due to a city policy of nonenforcement of the rape laws. The complaint alleged that after being raped in her car, she reported the rape and identity of the
rapist. The acting police chief and police commissioner refused
to question the rapist and three men overheard discussing the
rape. The plaintiff further alleged that the inaction of city officials denied her due process, equal protection, and the privileges
and immunities of citizenship. The trial court entered judgment
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint after sustaining defendant's
demurrers without leave to amend. The court of appeal reversed,

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 14

1294 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1287

holding that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to
state a cause of action for violation of the Federal Civil Rights
Act of 1871. The court also held that the plaintiff's action was
not barred by the immunity provisions of the California Tort
Claims Act that provides for public entity immunity from liability for an "injury caused by failure to properly enforce a law.

6. Attorney's Failure to Request Psychiatric Examination of
Victim
In re Leonard M., 100 Cal. App. 3d 11, 160 Cal. Rptr. 631
(2d Dist. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 79-1787, (U.S., May 9,
1980). The juvenile court found that a sixteen year old boy had
committed a lewd act on a six year old girl. The minor appealed,
contending that 1) the evidence did not support the finding, and
2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to seek a psychiatric· examination of the girl. The
court of appeal, in a two to one decision, affirmed the juvenile
court's findings. The court determined that the child's testimony
was not in conflict with the medical testimony and was sufficient
to support the finding of the trial court. The court held that the
failure of counsel to seek a psychiatric exam in child abuse cases
is not incompetent representation as a matter of law (People v.
Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974», and
that in order to sustain an allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel, appellant must make an affirmative showing that his attorney's decision was based on ignorance of the law (People v.
Jenkins, 13 Cal. 3d 749, 532 P.2d 857, 119 Cal. Rptr. 705
(1975».
7. Evidentiary/Procedural Error Prejudicial to Defendant
People v. St. Andrew, 101 Cal. App. 3d 450, 161 Cal. Rptr.
634 (1st Dist. 1980). The defendant, a hospital attendant, was
convicted of rape by threat and forcible oral copulation on a
mental patient. Prior to trial, the defense attorney's motion to
disqualify the trial judge was denied for failure to meet procedural requirements. Testimony of a former mental patient that the
defendant had kissed her was admitted to show defendant's propensity to use female patients for sexual gratification. The court
of appeal reversed, holding that in a close criminal case, turning
primarily on the respective credibility of the defendant and the
alleged victim, any substantial error tending to discredit the deWomen's Law Forum
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss3/14
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fense or to corroborate the prosecution must be considered prejudicial. In the instant case the trial court was found to have
committed substantial error in 1) admitting the testimony of the
former patient for purposes of showing a continuing plan by defendant to use psychiatric patients for sexual gratification, 2)
failing to correct the motion to challenge the trial judge when all
that was required was a simple statement by the judge of the
procedural requirement necessary to make the motion successful, and 3) refusing to allow the defense to cross examine the
victim during the competency hearing.
B.
1.

PROSTITUTION

SUfficiency of Evidence for Conviction of Pimping

People v. Kent, 96 Cal. App. 3d 130, 158 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1st
Dist. 1979). The defendant was found guilty of pimping, pandering, battery, and the intentional infliction of great bodily injury.
The defendant appealed on the ground that his conviction was
not supported by substantial evidence. The court pf appeal affirmed. The trial court record indicated that the defendant had'
introduced a woman to prostitution and informed her of the
techniques to be used. He delivered her each night to a selected
street location and then picked her up the next morning, after
which he collected all her earnings. When her income was below
average, he often beat her, as a result of which she was hospitalized at least four times. The woman testified that she shared her
earnings with him. The court of appeal also held that the trial
court properly refused to instruct the jury on Penal Code section
647(b), which provides that a person who solicits or engages in
any act of prostitution is guilty of disorderly conduct, as a lesser
offense necessarily included in the crimes of pimping and pandering. The record indicated that the defendant, if guilty at all,
was guilty of the crimes of pimping and pandering.
C.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

1. Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction of Felony Child
Abuse

People v. Jaramillo, 98 Cal. App. 3d 830, 159 Cal. Rptr. 771
(2d Dist. 1979). The court of appeal affirmed rulings of the trial
court that defendant mother was guilty of felony child endangering (Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (1», using a dangerous
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weapon as a separate offense, and of inflicting great bodily injury on one of her daughters. The mother had administered discipline to her daughters with a wooden dowel. The court found
substantial evidence that the mother's actions were "likely to
produce great bodily harm" within the meaning of Penal Code
section 273a thus qualifying the violation as a felony. Further,
the court determined there were sufficient facts on which to base
a finding of great bodily injury (Penal Code section 12022.7),
and that the dowel was a deadly weapon.
D.
1.

LEGISLATION

Rape

A.B. 546 - Mori
Chapter 994
Statutes of 1979
Spousal Rape. Establishes a separate category. Exempts
individuals convicted of spousal rape from mandatory prison
sentences and allows prosecution as a misdemeanor.
S.B. 13 - Richardson
Chapter 944
Statutes of 1979
Forcible Lewd and Lascivious Acts. Establishes forcible
lewd and lascivious conduct as a crime and prohibits probation
for that and other violent sex crimes. Creates a series of new and
longer enhancements for repeat offenders and changes the
method by which terms are calculated for violent offenses. Bars
Youth Authority commitment for some repeat offenders, and
changes sex offender registration procedures· and penalties for
violation.

2. Domestic Violence
A.B. 265 - Nolan
Chapter 367
Statutes of 1979
Child Abuse Pilot Project. Appropriates $80,000 for two
child abuse project centers and requires $20,000 in local matching funds.
Women's Law Forum
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S.B. 9 - Smith
Chapter 795
Statutes of 1979
Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Expands and strengthens the court's authority to enforce laws related to the .prevention of domestic violence. Creates new categories under which
temporary restraining orders may be issued.
S.B. 355 - Presley
Chapter 913
Statutes of 1979
Diversion Program for Domestic Violence Defendants.
Under provisions of the program, individuals meeting specified
requirements will be diverted from the criminal justice system
and into an educational, treatment or rehabilitation program.
S.B. 965 - Dills
Chapter 129
Statutes of 1979
Temporary Restraining Orders. Amends section 527 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Extends from thirty to ninety the maximum number of days for which a court may issue a temporary
restraining order.
II. FAMILY LAW
A.

1.

WRONGFUL DEATH AND NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS

Emotional Distress/Loss of Consortium in the Absence of
Physical Injury

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 80 L.A. DAILY
D.A.R. 2397 (Aug. 28, 1980). The trial court sustained
defendant's demurrer to a husband's complaint alleging negligently inflicted emotional distress and loss of consortium, caused
by emotional injury to his wife due to an erroneous diagnosis of
syphilis. The complaint stated that defendant diagnosed the
wife as having syphilis and subjected her to massive doses of
penicillin. Blood tests established that the husband did not have
the disease. Suspicions of extramarital sexual activities and mutual hostility led to the breakup of the marriage. The appellate
court modified the judgment to dismiss both causes of action on
grounds that there is no recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of consortium absent physical injury. WritJOURNAL,
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ing for the majority, Justice Mosk stated that the unqualified
requirement of physical injury was no longer justifiable. The essential question is one of proof of a serious and compensable injury, to be presented to the trier of fact. Holding that similar
reasoning applied to both claims, the judgment was reversed.

2. Imputed Contributory Negligence in Loss of Consortium
Action
Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22
(1st Dist. 1979), hearing denied, Nov. 2, 1979. Plaintiff brought
suit for loss of consortium based on injuries to her husband from
the collision of two trucks. The trial cpurt reduced the plaintiff's
recovery by the proportion of negligence attributed to her
spouse, the driver of one of the trucks. The court of appeal reversed, hold~ng that 1) contributory negligence may not be imputed merely 011 the basis of marital relationship and 2) loss of
consortium is not a derivative action-although a wife's cause of
action "arises" from the bodily injury to her husband, the injury
suffered is personal to the. wife and is comprised of her own
physical, psychological and emotional pain and anguish.
3. Spouse's Extramarital Activities in Loss of Consortium
Action
Morales v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 194 (5th Dist. 1979). In a wrongful death action, the trial
court ordered plaintiff husband to answer interrogatories concerning his extramarital sexual activities. The court of appeal directed the trial court to modify its order so that the husband
would not be required to give names, addresses and telephone
numbers. The court held that evidence of extramarital sexual
conduct is relevant to the nature of the personal relationship between husband and wife and thus to whether there was loss of
love, companionship and sexual relations to the husband. However, since the trial court was dealing with the husband's constitutionally protected right of privacy, it had to justify its impairment of that right with a compelling state interest and draw its
order with narrow specificity. The government objective of a fair
trial would be served if the husband was required to state only
whether, during some relevant period, he dated and had extra
marital contacts with women and when those contacts took
place.
Women's Law Forum
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INHERITANCE DETERMINATIONS

1. Widow's Allowance Subject to Inheritance Tax
Estate of Schley, 100 Cal. App. 3d 161, 161 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1st Dist. 1979). The trial court upheld a widow's objections to a
tax referee report that included the value of her widow's allowance in the husband's estate for inheritance purposes. The allowance was payable monthly during her life or until she remarried. The court of appeal reversed, holding that because the
legislature did not exempt pension rights under private plans
from the inheritance tax and provided for the handling of contingent interests in Revenue and Taxation Code section 13411
subdivision (d), the legislature intended that benefits such as
those under consideration were subject to the inheritance tax.
The court rejected the contention that there was no transfer
taking place at death within the meaning of the inheritance tax
provisions. The court pointed out that 1) the pension rights were
procured through expenditures of the decedent, 2) they were
consideration for his employment rather than a gratuity, and 3)
the fact that the transfer, made during decedent's lifetime, did
not take effect in possession or enjoyment until the time of the
decedent's death did not defeat the tax. The court also held that
a transfer occurred even though the decedent had no right to
name a successor, since the pension plan provided for a widow's
monthly allowance and there was no evidence that he preferred
any other arrangement.
2. Apportionment of Life Insurance Proceeds Based on Nature of Contributions
Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581
(4th Dist. 1979). The trial ~ourt ruled that the proceeds of a
group life insurance policy must be apportioned between two
beneficiaries according to the amount of community and separate property funds paid toward its premiums. The decedent
had been paying premiums out of his salary for nearly twenty
years. He was married at the. time coverage began, but he and
his wife separated eight months before his death. After separation, he changed the beneficiary designation on the policy from
his wife to his children. The court of appeal affirmed, holding
that the nature of the policy benefits was derived from the contract which had its inception during the marriage and was preserved for almost twenty years by the payment of premiums out
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of community funds.
C.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

1. Division of Quasi-Community Property

In re Marriage of Fink, 25 Cal. 3d 877, 603 P.2d 881, 160
Cal. Rptr. 516 (1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court
granted an interlocutory judgment and divided the couple's
community property by using the asset distribution method.
Subsequently, the husband moved for and was granted a new
trial on the sole ground that there was an error in law regarding
the division of quasi-community property held by the couple.
The trial court had awarded certain real property in Florida to
the husband and other Florida real property to the wife. The
husband asserted that Civil Code section 4800.5 requires an inkind division. The Code section provides that real property in
another state shall, if possible, be divided so that it is not necessary to change the nature of the interests in such property. The
supreme court modified the judgment and then affirmed. The
court held that nothing in Civil Code section 4800.5 requires
out-of-state real property to be divided in kind, and that the
trial court was well within its discretion in concluding that it
was impossible to achieve a practical and equal division of community property without affecting record title to the property.
Because no errol' of law appeared to have been committed in the
trial court's division of the community property, the court concluded that the trial court erred in granting a new trial.
2. Goodwill Valuation of Community Property Business
In re Marriage of Winn, 98 Cal. App. 3d 363, 159 Cal. Rptr.
554 (2d Dist. 1979). In a marriage dissolution proceeding, the
trial court awarded a business found to be community property
to the husband and required him to give the wife a note for onehalf its value. The trial court also awarded the wife spousal support of $500.00 per month for forty-two months. The court of
appeal affirmed. Although community property is ordinarily divided in kind, Civil Code section 4800 subdivision (b) provides
that "where economic circumstances warrant, the court may
award any asset to one party on such conditions as it deems
proper to effect a substantially equal division of the property."
The court held that while the business had no saleable value to
Women's Law Forum
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another, it had good will value to the husband and it was proper,
under the statute, to compel him to pay for what he retained.
The court also affirmed the order for spousal support. The husband's financial statement showed he was capable of paying the
amount and the wife, unemployed at the time of the trial,
showed that she had been unsuccessful in securing work.

In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 686 (1st Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial
court entered an interlocutory judgment· dividing the parties'
community property and awarding the wife both spousal and
child support. In dividing the community property, the court assigned a zero value to the husband's interest in the goodwill of
his group medical practice. The court based its evaluation on the
practice. partnership agreement that in the event of the husband's departure from the group, his interest would be repurchased with no separate value given for goodwill. In order to
equalize the division of community assets, the court ordered the
husband to execute a promissory note in favor of the wife secured by his interest in the group practice and bearing an interest of ten percent per annum, payable annually. The court of
appeal reversed for a redetermination of the husband's interest
in the goodwill of his group practice. The court held that the
wife was entitled to a share of the husband's interest in the
practice as a going concern on the date of dissolution, an interest
which could not be ascertained solely by reference to the partnership agreement, despite the fact that the wife had cosigned
the agreement. The court further held that the award of a fiveyear promissory note was an appropriate method of equalizing
the division of community property. The note's actual value was
not substantially less than its face value because it was secured
by the husband's interest in his partnership; it bore a sufficiently
high interest rate to compensate for inflation, and it was payable
in full after a relatively short period. The court also held that
the trial court had not erred in failing to consider the possible
tax consequences of awarding the note to the wife, in the absence of any evidence that she would incur an immediate and
specific additional tax liability.
3. Division of Personal Injury Awards
In re Marriage of Mason, 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 350 (5th Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the court
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of appeal upheld the actions of the trial court in denying spousal
support to the wife, and awarding the bulk of a $400,000 personal injury judgment to the husband. Civil Code section 4800(c)
provides that. community property personal injury damages shall
be assigned to the party who suffers the injuries. The personal
injury judgment had been received as a result of the husband's
permanently disabling injury. Despite the fact that the wife's
name was placed on the instrument creating the trust fund in
which the money damages were placed, the wife failed to offer
evidence establishing that the initial trust instrument constituted the creation of her separate property. The court of appeal
also affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the wife was capableof full-time employment and not in need of spousal support.

4. Separate Property Funds Used for Community Residence
In re Marriage of Trantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 556 (2d Dist. 1979), hearing denied, Aug. 22, 1979. In a
dissolution proceeding, the trial court annulled the marriage, divided the community assets, and determinecf that the parties'
family residence was the husband's separate property. The court
of appeal reversed, holding that the husband had failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that the family
residence was community property where 1) the title was taken
in joint tenancy and 2) there was no evidence of a common understanding that the joint tenancy deed was to have a legal effect different from that given it by Civil Code section 5110. The
court further held that in the absence of any communicated intention to the contrary, a residence acquired during marriage by
joint tenancy is community property regardless of the fact that
the source of funds which went into its down payment is clearly
traceable to the separate property of one spouse. A gift of separate property funds to the community is presumed unless there
is proof of an agreement between the parties to the contrary,
and regardless of the marriage being declared a nullity.
In re Mar1'iage of Sparks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 353, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 638 (4th Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial
court awarded the wife a house built with her separate property
funds but determined the land on which the house was built to
be community property. Accordingly, the husband was given a
credit for one-half the appreciated value of the land. The court
Women's Law Forum
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of appeal affirmed holding that 1) there was substantial evidence
that the wife did not intend to make a gift of the house to the
community, 2) the wife alone had authorized its construction,
and 3) the money used to build the house had been a gift to the
wife.

5. Married Woman's Property Acquired by Written Instrument
In re Marriage of Ashodian, 96 Cal. App. 3d 43, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 555 (2d Dist. 1979), hearing denied, Nov. 8, 1979. In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court rule that properties and proceeds acquired in the wife's name in connection with her real
estate business were her separate property in accordance with
the presumption raised by Civil Code section 5110. The section
states that property acquired by a married w<?man prior to 1975
by an instrument in writing, is her separate property. The court
of appeal affirmed, holding that 1) Civil Code section 5110 is an
exception to the general presumption that all property acquired
after marriage is community property and 2) the section must be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court
agreed with the lower court that the husband failed to rebut the
presumption and that he had made a gift of his community interest in the properties by his unwillingness to have any involvement in the business, or to sign the grant deeds necessary to
facilitate their transfer.
6. Sale of Family Residence
In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161 Cal.
Rptr.444 (4th Dist. 1980). A wife appealed from a portion of an
interlocutory decree, contending among other things, that the
trial court erred in failing to defer the sale of the family residence. The court of appeal remanded the case, holding that the
trial court failed to exercise proper discretion in denying the
wife's request to defer the sale where 1) the wife had been
awarded custody of the two minor children who had lived in the
house all their lives and wished to remain, 2) sale of the home
would subject the wife to serious economic hardship including
high interest rates, tight credit and increased market prices, and
3) the husband's income was adequate to provide for his own
needs and the court-ordered support of his former wife and
children.
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D.
1.

CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL

Physical Handicap as Consideration in Custody Award

In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36. 157
Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court
ordered a change in child custody from the father to the mother.
The mother had relinquished custody by written agreement
when the couple separated almost five years before and had not
seen the children from the time of the separation until a few
days prior to the hearing. The father was a quadriplegic as the
result of an accident that occurred after separation while he was
serving in the military reserve. The .trial court awarded custody
to the mother on the ground of the father's disability which, it
stated, would prevent a normal relationship between father and
sons. The supreme court reversed the portion of the interlocutory decree transferring custody of the minor children to the
mother. The court held that in light of the capabilities of, and
support services for physically handicapped, an accommodation
can be made between the policies requiring that a custody award
serve the best interests of the child, and the moral and legal obligation of soci,ety to respect the civil rights of the physically
handicapped. It is impermissible for the trial court to rely on a
physical handicap as prima facie evidence of a person's unfitness
as a parent or of probable detriment to the child.
2. Consent to Adoption by Presumed Father
W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 862 (2d Dist. 1980). In a proceeding by a husband and wife
to adopt an eight month old child whose natural mother consented to adoption at birth, the trial court awarded custody to
the child's biological father who had also appeared in the proceeding seeking custody. The biological father was, at the time
of conception and at the time of the proceeding, married to another woman. The court of appeal directed the trial court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing. Since the record
showed that the natural father and the mother had never attempted to marry, and that the child had never been in the father's home, the court held that he was not a "presumed father"
under Civil Code section 7004 subdivision (a), a part of the Uniform Parentage Act, and that his consent to the adoption was
not required. The court further held, however, that the natural
Women's Law Forum
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father was entitled to be heard in opposition to the adoption
proceeding and to present his own qualifications for custody.
The court also held that Civil Code section 7017 subdivision (d),
by permitting the adoption of a child with only the mother's
consent, does not create an impermissible gender-based distinction. Over strong dissent, the court reasoned that a statutory
scheme differentiating between fathers who have established a
parental relationship and those who have not, is constitutional
in light of the important state interest in protecting the best interests of the child.

3. Disputes Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act
Palm v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 456, 158 Cal. Rptr.
786 (4th Dist. 1979). The father of a minor child, a resident of
North Dakota, sought to compel the California superior court to
stay its child custody proceedings. The court had determined
that it had jurisdiction to hear the dispute under the provisions
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The
father had already obtained the jurisdiction of the North Dakota
Court to hear the same matter. The California court ordered the
father to dismiss his North Dakota change of custody action, to
refile it in California and to transfer custody of the child to the
mother pending a full hearing. The court of appeal found that
under the UCCJA, both California and North Dakota had jurisdiction over the custody of the child: California, because it was
the home state of the child; North Dakota, because it was the
home state of the father and the state which issued the original
divorce custody decree. Further, the court of appeal directed the
superior court to stay all proceedings under Civil Code section
5155 subdivision (1) since 1) a custody proceeding intitiated by
the father was already pending in North Dakota, 2) the relief
sought by the mother amounted to a modification of the original
North Dakota decree, 3) North Dakota, as the court which rendered the initial custody decree, had continuing jurisdiction
under the UCCJA and 4) there was nothing in the record to
show North Dakota was not acting substantially in conformity
with the Act.
Allison v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (2d Dist. 1980). A father, the custodial parent living in
Texas, sought dismissal in the California court of the mother's
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order to show cause regarding contempt and modification of
child custody. The show cause order was issued following the father's refusal to permit the children to visit their mother in California, in alleged contravention of a stipulated California custody order. Prior to the California hearing date, the father filed
a petition in the Texas courts that resulted in an order purporting to terminate the mother's visitation rights. The Texas hearing was held in the mother's absence after three days notice and
a denial of her request for a continuance. The mother subsequently petitioned the California court to modify custody and
the father moved to dismiss the proceedings under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The court of appeal denied the
father's petition for mandate, holding that California acquired
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination under Civil
Code section 5152 subdivision (l)(b). The court further held
that the California courts were not constrained by principles of
comity from an appropriate exercise of jurisdiction since Texas
was not a state exercising child custody jurisdiction substantially
in conformity with the Uniform Act. (Civil Code sections 5154,
5155).

4. Removal of Child From Parental Custody
Adoption of D.S.C., 93 Cal. App. 3d 14, 155 Cal. Rptr. 406
(4th Dist. 1979), hearing denied, Sept. 12, 1979. The court of
appeal affirmed a trial court decision declaring a minor child
free from the custody and control of his natural father, and placing him with adoptive parents. Civil Code section 232(a)(4) provides that a minor may be taken from a parent convicted of a
felony if the facts of the crime are of such a nature as to prove
the unfitness of the parent. The court held that in determining
whether the legal relationship between child and natural parent
should be severed, the parental rights doctrine is not to be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Rather, to terminate
parental rights, it must also be determined that the· parent
whose rights are to be terminated is unfit, and that continuing
parental custody would be detrimental to the child. In this. case,
the father had spent the last thirteen years incarcerated for various robbery offenses. The court concluded there was substantial
evidence of parental unfitness and detriment to the child, and
that allowing the adoption was in the child's best interest.
Women's Law Forum
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In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280
(2d Dist. 1979). In dependency proceedings arising out of the
physical abuse of a child by her unmarried mother, the trial
court dismissed the county's petition with prejudice and released the child to the custody of her father, who lived apart
from the mother. The court of appeal reversed, holding that
when there are two parents with separate homes, a child can be
removed from the home of the unfit parent at the adjudication
hearing without prejudicing the other parent's right to gain custody of the child at the second dispositional hearing. The court
also held that the trial court erred in finding the father made a
sufficient showing of his capability to provide parental care since
1) he had no home of his own and 2) he was away so often that
he intended to leave the child with relatives for full-time care.
Finally, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion
in dismissing the petition with prejudice.
In re Jeanette S., 94 Cal. App. 3d 52, 156 Cal. Rptr. 262
(5th Dist. 1979). The trial court entered judgment declaring a
five-year-old child to be a dependent of the juvenile court and,
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361 subdivisions (a) and (b), removed the child from her mother's custody
and control. The court of appeal upheld the trial court's order
that the child be declared a dependent of the court but reversed
the dispositional hearing. The court held that clear and convincing proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the
child, and detriment to the child if she remains with the parents
are both required before custody can be awarded to a non-parent. Two reasonable alternatives were available to the trial court
short of removing the child from the custody of her parents: 1)
the child could have been returned to her mother under stringent conditions of supervision, or 2) assuming that the mother
was incapable of providing a suitable home, the child could have
been placed with her divorced father ..
In re Jacqueline H., 94 Cal. App. 3d 808, 156 Cal. Rptr. 765
(2d Dist. 1979). The court of appeal affirmed a trial court terminating a mother's parental rights to her minor daughter on the
grounds of abandonment. The court of appeal upheld the trial
court, finding that the mother had abandoned her child where 1)
the child had been in a foster home for approximately four
years, 2) the mother's failure to engage in psychological and

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 14

1308 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1287

family counseling had resulted in the termination of her visitation rights, and 3) she had made only a token effort to regain
those rights. The court of appeal also held that because no miscarriage of justice appeared to have resulted from the trial
court's failure to appoint counsel for the child, the error was
harmless.

5. Removal of Child From Adoptive Placement
Marten v. Thies, 99 Cal. App. 3d 161, 160 Cal. Rptr. 57 (4th
Dist. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1850, (U.S., May 20, 1980).
The trial court refused to compel the county adoption agency to
return a minor child to its prospective adoptive parents. The
agency had removed the child without advance notice because it
believed that notice to the couple would place the child in imminent danger. The evidence showed that the wife was emotionally
unstable and dependant on the child for her emotional needs,
that both the husband and wife were insensitive to the child's
needs, and that the couple, in order to obtain the adoptive
placement, had concealed their marital differences and had
failed to report their subsequent separation as required by their
agreement with the agency. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court
finding that the child was in imminent danger and that removal
from the home without prior notice was justified. The court also
upheld the trial court's finding that to return the child to the
adoptive husband and wife would be detrimental to the child.
The appellate court rejected the wife's request, made in her reply brief, that independent counsel could be appointed to represent the child when there was nothing in the record to suggest that the agency had any concern other than the welfare of
the child.
6. Rights of Non-Custodial Parents
In re Marriage of Oldfield, 94 Cal. App. 3d 259, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 224 (1st Dist. 1979). A husband seeking modification of his
visitation rights, was denied a request to have his former wife
disclose her address, and was ordered by the trial court to pick
up and return the children to the grandparents' home. The trial
court also directed the husband to pay all mortgage payments
and late charges which had accrued from the time he ceased using the community residence until the close of its sale. The court
Women's Law Forwn
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of appeal affirmed the order requiring the husband to pick up
and return the children to their grandparent's house, but reversed as to his obligation to pay all charges due on the family
residence. The court held that, in the absence of any evidence
showing it would be unwise for the husband to have his children's address, the denial was an impermissible curtailment of
his contact with them. As to the mortgage payments and late
charges, the court held that the fact that a husband assumes the
mortgage payments while he is living in the community residence does not alter the nature of the debt when the couple separates. Once the husband leaves the residence, each party should
pay one-half the mortgage payments and late charges incurred
until the close of the sale.

E.

SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT

1. Enforcement of Child Support Orders

In re Marriage of Moffat, 94 Cal. App. 3d 724, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 609 (2d Dist. 1979), hearing granted, Oct. 11, 1979. The
court of appeal affirmed a trial court order that a husband pay
his former wife child support pursuant to the Revised Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA). After obtaining custody of the children under a prior judgment, the wife
prevented her ex-husband from exercising his visitation rights
although he was paying spousal and child support pursuant to
court order. The court found her in contempt and excused the
husband from making spousal or child support payments until
she complied with the court order. The wife then moved to another state and filed for child support payments under the Act.
The court of appeal held that refusal of visitation does not prevent a wife from pursuing child support under the Revised Act.
The court also held that the prior court order excusing the husband's duty of support pending his wife's cooperation with his
rights of visitation was not res judicata and did not render the
subsequent order for child support invalid.
In re Marriage of Thompson, 96 Cal. App. 3d 621, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 160 (4th Dist. 1979). An interlocutory judgment of dissolution contained no order for child support, however, the court
maintained jurisdiction to modify the provision. Soon after separation, the husband was jailed for attempting to abduct the parties' two children. The wife filed a motion seeking modification
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of child support. The court awarded child support on the condi.
tion that an allotment could be obtained from the Navy to pay
support while the husband was in custody. The husband imme·
diately appealed the order. When he failed to comply with the
terms of the child support order, he was held in contempt and
directed to execute the documents necessary to obtain the Navy
allotment. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that 1) modifi·
cation of the support provisions of an otherwise final judgment
of dissolution is permitted, 2) the filing of a notice of appeal
does not necessarily stay the order which is being appealed, 3)
the trial court properly used a contempt proceeding to enforce
its child support order and 4) the trial court did not err in
awarding the husband's truck to the wife as partial payment of
child support.

.

In re Marriage of Popenhager, 99 Cal. App. 3d 514, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1st Dist. 1979). In February 1969, a trial court en·
tered an interlocutory decree awarding a wife $200 per month
child support. She subsequently moved to another state and,
under the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA) sought to enforce the terms of her inter·
locutory decree. In June 1969, at a California hearing on the re·
ciprocal action, the husband stated that he could only pay a
maximum of thlrty dollars per month and was ordered to pay
that sum. The tlial court made no mention of the existing inter·
locutory judgment. The husband made payments sporadically,
and in 1977, the wife again sought to enforce the original order.
The California court issued a writ of execution for arrearages
amounting to over $18,000.00, representing the total amount for
child support owed under the interlocutory decree less the
amounts paid by the husband pursuant to the reciprocal action
order of $30.00 per month. The husband moved to quash the
writ and consolidate all proceedings. The trial court granted his
motion to reduce child support and to modify arrearages to the
thirty dollars per month specified in the reciprocal action order.
The trial court specifically found that the reciprocal order action
superseded the support provisions of the original decree. The
court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court held that
under former Code of Civil Procedure section 1689, a reciprocal
support order did not act to supersede a prior order arising from
a dissolution action where no specific plea for modification had
been made. Accordingly, the husband was continuously obliWomen's Law Forum
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gated to pay child support obligations at the rate of $200.00 per
month up until the 1977 modification. The court further held it
error to deny interest on arrearages, and to deny attorney fees in
the absence of findings on the parties' income and need.

In re Marriage of DeMore, 93 Cal. App. 3d 785, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 899 (1st Dist. 1979). The court of appeal reversed a trial
order that a mother was not entitled to a wage assignment for
overdue child support. Civil Code section 4701(b) provides that
a trial court shall order a defaulting parent to assign wages once
a finding is made that child support payments are in arrears in a
sum equal to the amount of two months' payment. The order is
mandatory despite the fact that the defaulting parent has subsequently paid the arrearages. The court found that the statute
bears a rational relationship to a valid state interest and does
not deprive the non-custodial parent of due process.
In re Marriage of Hudson, 95 Cal. App. 3d 72, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1st Dist. 1979). In a proceeding to enforce child support payments, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court order
that a husband pay his former wife arrearages of child support
due beyond the ten-year period from entry of the original judgment. Although the former wife did not file an affidavit, the
court held that a combination of her written declaration and her
testimony at trial constituted substantial compliance with Code
of Civil Procedure section 685. Section 685 provides that a judgment may be enforced after the lapse of ten years from the date
of its entry by leave of the court on a motion, accompanied by
an affidavit setting forth the reasons for failure to proceed with
enforcement within ten years.
2. Definition of Cohabitation for Purposes of Reduced Spousal
Support
In re Marriage of Thweatt, 96 Cal. App. 3d 530, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 826 (4th Dist. 1979). A wife filed contempt proceedings
against her former husband for his failure to pay spousal support. At the hearing, the husband moved for a reduction or termination of the spousal support on the ground that his wife was
cohabiting with another man and his son, thus creating a rebuttable presumption of decreased need for support under Civil
Code section 4801.5. The trial court denied the husband's motion and found him in contempt of court. The court of appeal
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affirmed, holding that in the absence of a sexual, romantic or
homemaker-companion relationship, the presence of two male
boarders sharing expenses with the wife did not amount to cohabitation within the meaning of the statute. The court also
held that there was no evidence of an actual decreased need on
the part of the wife, who was fifty years old and unemployed.
.J

3. County Right to Reimbursement for Public Assistance
Payments
Amie v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 421, 160 Cal. Rptr.
271 (4th Dist. 1979). The county sought to establish child support and be reimbursed for public assistance from the noncustodial father of a minor child. The father demurred to the extent
that the county demanded recovery of money paid for the support of the child more than three years prior to the filing of the
complaint, The trial court overruled the demm'rer and the father
than sought a writ of mandate. The court of appeal initially denied the writ but the supreme court remanded with directions to
issue an alternative writ. The appellate court then held that 1)
the county's action, based on Welfare and Institutions Code section 11350 and Civil Code section 248 is subject to the three year
limitation period of Code of Civil Procedure 338 subdivision (1),
2) a noncustodial parent is not required to reimburse another for
support furnished to a child in the absence of an order or agreement, and 3) the county has no right to reimbursement derived
by way of assignment or subrogation, from the childs' right to
parental support.
County of Los Angeles v. Ferguson, 94 Cal. App, 3d 549, 156
Cal. Rptr. 565 (2d Dist. 1979). In an action brought by the
county on behalf of a minor child against his father for child
support, the triSll court granted judgment on the pleadings for
defendant on the basis of 1) deficiencies in the form complaint,
2) the county's failure to state that the child was receiving public assistance, and 3) the complaint's failure to state that the
father was in default of a valid order for child support in existence in another county. The court of appeal affirmed, holding
that a complaint brought by the county under the provisions of
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 11350.1 and 11475.1
must plead that the county has standing to sue based on the
minor or his mother being granted aid by the county or on the
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district attorney being asked to enforce a support obligation on
behalf of the individual for whom the support order was made.
The court also held that the county's action was superseded by a
prior judgment made in another county pursuant to the Family
Law Act. The court noted that the appropriate action in a case
where there is an existing order for support in Family Law Act
proceedings is by an order to show cause in the same proceeding.

4. Availability of Step-Parent Income in Determining ChildSupport Obligation
In re Marriage of Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 524 (3d Dist. 1979). A former husband, who had custody of
the couples' three children, sought an order to compel his former
wife to pay child support. As part of the proceedings, he obtained a subpoena ordering the deposition of the wife's present
husband and the production of income tax returns filed during
the second marriage. The present husband appeared at the deposition, but refused to produce the income tax returns and refused to testify, asserting spousal privilege. The first husband
sought sanctions on the ground that Civil Code section 250 precluded the assertion of the marital privilege in child support
proceedings. The trial court granted the second husband's motion to quash the subpoena. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court properly allowed the present husband to
assert the privilege. The court pointed out that Revenue and
Taxation Code section 19282, which prohibits disclosure of returns by the Franchise Tax Board, is construed to render both
state and federal income tax returns privileged. To require the
present husband to disclose his returns would be contrary to the
public policy and interest in the preservation of existing marital
relationships.
Camp v. Swoap, 94 Cal. App. 3d 733, 156 Cal. Rptr.. 600 (3d
Dist. 1979). The trial court held invalid the administrative regulations under which a specified portion of a nonadoptive stepfather's income was considered available for the support of is
wife's children from a prior relationship. Also determined to be
invalid was the practice of deducting such an amount from the
aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) grant that
would otherwise be paid on behalf of the children. The trial
court, relying primarily on Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)
and U. S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508
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(1973), held that the regulations denied AFDC recipients due
process of law by conclusively presuming that a nonadoptive
stepfather would make his wife's community property interest in
his earnings available to her for the support of her children. The
trial court also held that the state rules conflicted with federal
regulations governing the administration of the AFDC program·,
under which only the income of a natural, adoptive, or legally
obligated parent could be considered available for children in
the household, absent proof of actual contribution. The court of
appeal, relying on Weinberger v. Salli, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), rejected the trial court's ruling that a conclusive presumption of
income availability violates due process since the legislature
could have validly determined that limited AFDC resources
would not be well spent in making individual assessments of
stepfather income availability. However, it upheld the trial
court's holding that the state rules were incompatible with federal regulatory provisions barring states from assuming that persons not legally responsible would apply their resources to aid
dependant children.

5. Payment of Community Obligations as Spousal Support
In re Marriage of Chala, 92 Cal. App. 3d 996, 155 Cal. Rptr.
605 (2d Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court
required the husband to pay all community obligations, but considered one-half of the payments to be spousal support. The
court of appeal reversed, holding that community assets and obligations must be divided equally when the community assets
exceed the community obligations. In appropriate circumstances
a spouse can be ordered to pay continuing community debts as
spousal support. Those circumstances are: 1) when the payment
is to third parties for the future living expenses of the supported
spouse; 2) when the supporting spouse's payment of past debts
will protect the supported spouse's future alimony money from
the reach of creditors; and 3) when the supporting spouse's postseparation, pre-trial payment of debts is in reality"'a discharge of
the paying spouse's duty to support the other spouse. None of
the circumstances set forth were present in t1ais case. The trial
court also failed to follow the criteria for spousal support set
forth in Civil Court section 4801, making the resultant division
of community property unequal.
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In re Marriage of Marx, 92 Cal. App. 3d 984, 155 Cal. Rptr.
609 (2d Dist. 1979). The court of appeal reversed the trial
court's division of community property in a dissolution proceeding, holding that a husband cannot be ordered to pay community obligations as additional spousal support when the wife has
already been awarded a reasonable monthly support sum. In addition, such a disposition violates Civil Code section 4801(b) in
that it requires the husband to pay the debt regardless of the
wife's remarriage or death before full payment is made. The
court of appeal held that under In re Marriage 0/ Brigden, 80
Cal. App. 3d 380, 145 Cal. Rptr. 716 (2d Dist. 1978), absent economic circumstances warranting the assignment of an entire asset to one spouse, Civil Code section 4800 (b)(l) requires equal
in kind division. Further, it was error for the trial court to award
to the husband all of the community-owned pension fund when
he did not want the fund and when an inequitable tax consequence would result.
In re Marriage of Marx, 97 Cal. App. 3d 552, modified, 98
Cal. App. 3d 533c, 159 Cal. Rptr. 215 (2d Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court divided the community property, awarding the wife the family residence. The husband was
ordered to pay spousal and child support, and was also ordered
to pay a community obligation as additional spousal support.
The husband was awarded his pension fund at the face value of
the contributions deposited in it. The court of appeal reversed
the part of the order which required the husband to pay the
community obligation and affirmed all other aspects of the judgment. The court held that the debt should have been equally
divided between the parties since the wife had been given reasonable monthly support and there was no need to increase that
support by ordering the husband to assume responsibility for
the obligation. The court also held that the assignment of the
pension fund at its face value to the husband was proper. There
was no need to take into consideration the future taxes to be
paid by the husband when he received the fund since the taxes
.were not immediate and specific but were payable in the future
with the exact amount being speculative.
6. Modification of Spousal Support
In re Marriage of Kilkenny, 96 Cal. App. 3d 617, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (4th Dist. 1979). The trial court denied a husband's
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motion for modification of spousal support paid by him to his
former wife. The support obligation was originally set out in a
separation agreement which provided that its terms were "absolute, unconditional and irrevocable." The separation agreement
was later incorporated into the interlocutory and final decrees of
dissolution. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the support agreement was nonmodifiable under Civil Code section 4811
subdivision (b), which provides that an agreement for spousal
support is not modifiable if there is a written or oral agreement
for spousal support in open court specifically providing that the
support agreement is not modifiable. The court stated that the
terms "absolute, unconditional irrevocable," were intended to
prohibit modification of spousal ~upport by a later court decree.

7. Supporting Spouse's Ability to Earn as Standard for Support Award
In re Marriage of Wyatt, 98 Cal. App. 3d 898, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 784 (1st Dist. 1979). An ex-husband sought termination of
his obligation to pay spousal support. Instead, the trial court
substantially reduced his monthly support obligation on the basis of the continued decline in profits of his business. Both parties appealed and the court of appeal affirmed, holding that the
trial court properly based its award on the husband's ability to
earn rather than his actual income. The court rejected the husband's contention that the ability-to-pay standard may only be
used when it appears there is a deliberate attempt to avoid
family financial responsibility. The court also held that the trial
court adequately considered the amount of the wife's separate
property before making the award.

F.

HEALTH ANI!) WELFARE ISSUES

1. Public Funding of Abortion

t Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 93
Cal. App. 3d 492, 156 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1st Dist. 1979), hearing

t Because the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the
court of appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any principle of law. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing
Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This case appears in the Survey
for the sole purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the
high court.
Women's Law Forum
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granted, Sept. 12, 1979. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order against implementation of provisions of the
state's Budget Act of 1978 which restricted the circumstances
under which public funds could be used to pay for abortions for
Medi-Cal recipients. The trial court refused to issue a preliminary injunction, but stayed the denial pending outcome of the
appeal. The court of appeal reversed and remanded with directions to enjoin implementation of the Act only to the extent necessary to conform with the court's views. Over a well-reasoned
dissent, the appellate court held that the Budget Act did not
deny indigent women equal protection under either the federal
or state constitution. The state is not required to show a compelling state interest in justifying its policy choice. The distinction
drawn between childbirth and elective abortions by the Act's
funding restrictions is rationally related to the state's legitimate
interest in favoring normal childbirth. The court of appeal also
rejected the contention that the state's decision not to fund elective abortions violates the free exercise and the establishment of
religion clauses of the United States Constitution. When a law is
attacked on establishment of religion grounds, the court must
consider whether it furthers any of the primary evils which the
clause was intended to forestall, i.e., financial support for or involvement in a religious activity. The right of a woman to choose
to terminate her pregnancy is fundamental. The legislature has
not prohibited elective abortions but merely chosen not to use
public funds to pay for the elective abortions of any women,
whatever their religious p~rsuasion or economic status.
2. Class Action Against Manufacturers for DES Induced Injury During Pregnancy
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d
924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). The plaintiff, injured as a result
of a drug administered to her mother during pregnancy, brought
a class action against eleven drug companies who were manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol (DES). She alleged that they were
jointly liable for manufacturing, marketing, and promoting DES
asa safe drug for preventing miscarriage without adequate testing. 'Plaintiff further alleged that all the named defendants produced the drug from an industry-wide formula. Because plaintiff
could not identify the manufacturer of the specific DES which
caused her injuries, the trial court sustained defendants' demurrers without leave to amend.
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In a landmark decision, the supreme court reversed, noting
that "in an era of mass production and complex marketing
methods the traditional standard of negligence [is] insufficient
to govern obligations of manufacturer to consumer. . . . [Slome
adaptation of the rules of causation and liability may be appropriate. . . . " The court held that: 1) plaintiff's obligation is to
join in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of the
DES produced; 2) the extent of a defendant-manufacturer's liability may be measured by the amount of DES produced by a
manufacturer in proportion to the entire amount of DES sold to
the public; and 3) the burden of proof must shift to defendants
to demonstrate that they could not have produced the particular
substance which injured plaintiff.
G.

DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS

1. Nunc Pro Tunc Decree to Validate Otherwise Bigamous
Marriage
Coefield v. Coefield, 92 Cal. App. 3d 959, 155 Cal. Rptr. 335
(2d Dist. 1979). The trial court denied the motion of the putative wife of a deceased spouse for a nunc pro tunc order directing the entry of a final decree of dissolution of the marriage
of the deceased and his prior wife, pursuant to Civil Code section 4515. The court of appeal reversed the lower court. A common law marriage, valid where contracted, is recognized as valid
in California. Civil Code section 4515 requires that, in order for
a nunc pro tunc decree to validate an otherwise bigamous marriage, the second marriage must follow the nunc pro tunc date.
Here the second marriage preceded both the interlocutory decree of marriage and the proposed nunc pro tunc date. However,
since the putative spouse and her deceased husband had held
themselves out to be husband and wife in two states recognizing
common law marriages after the proposed nunc pro tunc date,
the court held that the putative spouse could claim the status of
a valid common law wife under the laws of either of those two
states at a time after the proposed nunc pro tunc date.
2. Entry of Final Decree Conditioned on Reimbursement to
County
In re Marriage of Sanabia, 95 Cal. App. 3d 483, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 56 (4th Dist. 1979). A wife obtained by default an interlocWomen's Law Forum
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utory decree of dissolution. The trial court conditioned entry of
final judgment on reimbursement to the county of a filing fee
previously waived because of the wife's indigency, and ordered
her to partially reimburse the county for welfare child support
payments. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to condition entry of the final decree on
the wife's reimbursement of the filing fee. The court also held
that the trial court could not order the sale of the community
stereo set to pay for the filing fee since the stereo is considered a
necessary household furnishing or appliance and is exempt from
execution. (Code of Civil Procedure section 690.1) Finally, the
court held that federal and state law limits the county's claim
for reimbursement of child support to non-custodial parents.
Because the wife had custody of the minor children and was eligible for welfare, the reimbursement order was improper.

3.

Willful Violation of Discovery Orders

In re Marriage of Stallcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 679 (3d Dist. 1979), modified on denial of rehearing, 98
Cal. App. 3d 533d. In an interlocutory decree of dissolution, the
trial court appointed a certified public accountant (CPA) to prepare a financial report on the couple's community assets, and
ordered the parties to turn over all necessary documents to the
accountant. When the issues of property division and support
were brought to trial almost four years later, the court found
that the husband had willfully disobeyed the discovery order,
and precluded him from introducing evidence of specified
financial transactions. On appeal by the husband from the judgment dividing community property and awarding child and
spousal support, the court of appeal affirmed. Holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence
of financial transactions, the court pointed out that the husband,
despite repeated court orders to deliver documents, had never
supplied meaningful information concerning the couple's
financial situation. The court further held that 1) the trial court
had properly valued community assets at a date near that of
separation rather than trial, 2) the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding that the husband had misappropriated a community bank account, 3) an award to the wife of one-half the
amount involved in the bank account in addition to one-half of
the other property did not allow her a double recovery, and 4)
the trial court did not err in ordering the husband to pay ten
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percent interest on the unpaid balance of installments due the
wife as her share of community property. Marital property dispositions are limited by judgment rate of interests, but are controlled by the dictates of fairness and equity under Civil Code
section 4800. Finally, distinguishing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. 572 (1979) as having only addressed benefits under the
1974 Railroad Retirement Act, the court rejected the husband's
contention that the trial court had improperly retained jurisdiction to modify any military pension and retirement rights.

4. Award of Attorney's Fees
In re Marriage of Pollard, 97 Cal. App. 3d 535, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (2d Dist. 1979). Pursuant to Civil Code Section
4370(a), the trial court ordered the husband to pay his ex-wife's
attorney's fees pursuant to his motion to modify visitation
rights. Both the husband and wife were welfare recipients. The
order was to take effect when the husband's income exceeded
$500.00 per month. Noting that ability to pay is one of four conditions which must be met to warrant an allowance of attorney's
fees, the court of appeal reversed, holding that since both parties
were legitimately on welfare and there was no showing of any
reasonable expectation of changed financial circumstances, it
was an abuse of discretion to impose on one of the parties an
obligation to pay the attorney contracted by the other.
5. Finality of Decree Dividing Community Property
In re Marriage of Shanahan, 95 Cal. App. 3d 295, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 30 (2d Dist. 1979). An action for dissolution was consolidated with an earlier separate maintainance action in which a
final decree had been entered establishing the family residence
as community property, and setting forth the circumstances
under which it could be sold. The trial court, in entering the
interlocutory decree, found that the earlier provision pertaining
to the family home was meant to be a form of support and
therefore modified the provisions by ordering the immediate sale
of the property. The court of appeal reversed, holding that once
it has become final, a decree dividing community property is not
subject to modification by a later decree, whether in the original
action or a subsequent one. The court found that a stipulation in
the separate maintenance action, and the decree based upon it,
expressly declared that the order pertaining to the family home
Women's Law Forum
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss3/14

34

Levine: California Law Survey
CALIFORNIA
LAW SURVEY

19801

1321

was intended to be a division of the community property of the
marriage .

.

6. Modification of Property Settlement
In re Marriage of Kaufman, 101 Cal. App. 3d 147, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 538 (2d Dist. 1980). The trial court approved terms of a
property division stipulated to in open court by a husband and
wife and ordered the wife's attorney to prepare the written order. Subsequently, counsel for the parties exchanged correspondence which discussed terms not previously agreed upon; a modified judgment was approved by both attorneys and signed by
the court. Two and one-half years later, the husband instituted
an action to conform the judgment to the original stipulation
and order, contending that there were clerical discrepancies between the stipulation and order and the signed judgment. The
wife asserted that the signed judgment accurately reflected modifications discussed in the correspondence between the attorneys. The trial court gave little weight to the correspondence,
viewing it as self-serving hearsay, and viewed the discrepancies
as clerical errors to be corrected in conformance with the original stipulation. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that there
was no direct evidence that the husband consented to anything
but the terms of the original stipulation and that any substantive modifications agreed to by counsel were not binding.
In re Marriage of Neilsen, 100 Cal. App. 3d 874, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 272 (1st Dist. 1980). Pursuant to a dissolution, the parties
signed a property settlement agreement containing a spousal
support provision, and incorporated but did not merge it into
the final judgment. Six years later, the wife requested and was
granted a modification of spousal support. The husband contended unsuccessfully, that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the support provision because the property settlement agreement had not been merged into the dissolution decree. The
court of appeal reversed. The court noted that under Civil Code
section 4811, spousal support provisions of property settlement
agreements are generally subject to judicial modification unless
the agreement specifically provides to the contrary. The code
section makes the concept of merger irrelevant to the determination of whether or not a court may modify a marriage settlement
agreement. In the instant case, however, language in the final
paragraph of the property settlement agreement stated that it
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"shall not depend for its effectiveness on [court] approval, nor
be affected thereby." This language was sufficient to bar judicial
modification.
.

7. Adjudication of Issues After Death of Party
In re Marriage of Williams, 101 Cal. App. 3d 507, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 808 (2nd Dist. 1980). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial
court awarded the wife temporary custody of the parties' children and five months later, the wife became seriously ill. Two
days before her death, the children's father petitioned the court
for custody. At the same time, the wife's mother and brother
moved for joinder in the dissolution. proceedings, seeking custody based on an allegation that the father was unfit. The trial
court denied the joinder motion on the grounds that the wife's
death terminated the dissolution proceeding as a matter of law
and therefore there was no pending action to which the mother
and brother could be joined. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that when a party to a dissolution dies, the court has the
power only to enter judgment in conformity with issues adjudicated before the death. Because the motion for joinder was not
adjudicated before the wife died, any right petitioners had in the
dissolution proceeding was terminated, and the court had no
choice but to deny their motion.
H.

PENSION AND DISABU,ITY BENEFITS

1. Res Judicata Effect of Dissolution Decree

Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr.
502 (1980). A wife's community property interest in her husband's matured federal military retirement pension was not
mentioned in their property settlement agreement or in the dissolution decree. Two years later, the wife moved for an order to
show cause why the retirement pension should not be divided as
community property. Her motion was denied on the grounds
that absent extrinsic fraud or mistake, the court has no jurisdiction to modify a property settlement agreement which has been
incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution. Approximately
two and one-half years later, the wife filed a complaint in the
superior court asking for 1) a determination that her husband's
military pension was community property to the extent it was
earned during their marriage; 2) a full accounting of all pension
Women's Law Forum
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payments received by her husband, and 3) a division of the community property portion of the pension. Her husband raised the
defense of res judicata and the trial court entered judgment on
his behalf.
The supreme court reversed, holding that while the dissolution of marriage and property settlement occurred before its ruling that federal military retirement pay is subject to California
community property law (In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592,517 P.2d
449, l11 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974», the decision was fully retroactive
in application. The court also held that failure to mention the
pension in the interlocutory decree did not bar the present proceeding because the wife's interest in the military pension was
distinct from her interest in other community property divided
at the time of dissolution. Because the question of dividing the
military pension was not before the court issuing the final dissolution decree, the decision of that court was not res judicata as
to the military pension.

t Mead v. Lachelt, 94 Cal. App. 3d 445, 156 Cal. Rptr. 444
(1st Dist.), hearing granted, Aug. 22, 1979. The trial court sustained a husband's demurrer to his former wife's action concerning her rights in his military retirement benefits. The court of
appeal affirmed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata was applicable to preclude the wife from asserting an interest in her
husband's military benefits where 1) the marriage had been dissolved eight years before without mention of the benefits, and 2)
the court had failed to reserve jurisdiction to divide the pension
benefits at a later time. The court further stated that In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976) limited the retroactivity of pension decisions to all cases
not yet final at that time.

2. Characterization of Benefits as Disability or Pension
In re Marriage of Samuels, 96 Cal. App. 3d 122, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 38 (1st Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, ninetyt Because the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the
court of appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any principle of law. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing
Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This case appears in the Survey
for the sole purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the
high court.
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four percent of a husband's disability annuity was determined to
be community property and the wife was awarded a one-half interest, payable retroactively. The judgment also determined that
the wife held a property interest in any fu~ure death benefits
and enjoined the husband from exercising his right to modify or
terminate her interest. Due to an injury, the husband had left
his civil service job when he was fifty years old. He began to
receive monthly disability benefits reduced in amount due to his
election to provide death benefits to his surviving spouse. When
the husband reached sixty-two years of age, he was to be eligible
for a deferred retirement annuity. The court of appeal reversed
and remanded, holding that the disability benefits received by
the husband when he terminated his employment served the
principal" purpose of compensating him for his injury and were
his separate property until he reached the age of sixty-two. At
that time, the disability benefits would become retirement benefits and therefore be community property. Accordingly, the wife
was entitled to an allocation of the present actuarial value of the
community interest, or an award of one-half the benefits paid on
the husband's attaining the age of sixty-two. The court further
held that because survivorship benefits are payable only to an
employee's spouse, an ex-wife has no community interest in such
benefits when dissolution occurs before retirement. Therefore,
the trial court was in error in attempting to restrain the husband
from terminatilllg or modifying the existing survivorship benefits.

In re Marriage of Reyes, 97 Cal. App. 3d 876, 159 Cal. Rptr.
84 (5th Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the wife joined
the husband's pension trust fund as a party and secured a decree ordering direct payments to her. Upon the fund's unsuccessful appeal from judgment, the wife moved the trial court to
assess attorney fees against the fund but the trial court denied
the motion. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that Civil
Code section 4370 explicitly restricts the court's authority to order the payment of attorney fees to "the husband or wife, father
or mother", and there is nothing in the statute's legislative history or in case law that would authorize an interpretation allowing such an order against any other party in a dissolution
proceeding. Generally attorney fees are not recoverable from an
opposing party in the absence of express statutory or contractual
authority (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021) or in exceptional circumstances. The wife failed to bring her case within
Women's Law Forum
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any of the specified exceptions. The court also rejected the wife's
contention, made for the first time on oral argument, that she
was entitled to attorney fees under 29 USC section 1132(g)
which authorizes an award of attorney fees to a "participant,
beneficiary or fiduciary." The court held that the wife's failure
to raise that argument at trial or in her opening brief constituted a waiver.

In re Marriage of Webb, 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156 Cal. Rptr.
334 (1st Dist. 1979). In a dissolution of a twenty-five year marriage, the trial court 1) found that the husband's police pension
was for disability and would remain his separate property even
after he reached retirement age despite the fact that his contribution to the retirement fund during marriage was community
property, 2) ordered" the husband to pay his wife spousal support
for three years, followed by step-down support for seven years
and termination thereafter, and 3) valued the goodwill of the
husband's business. The court of appeal reversed the characterization of the disability pension, reversed the termination of
spousal support, and affirmed the rest of the judgment. The
court determined that the community interest in the pension
was equal to the ratio between the number of years the husband
worked as a police officer during the marriage and the total
number of years from the date of his hiring to the date he would
become eligible for longevity retirement benefits. Noting that
the city charter provided for a recalculation of the benefits received by a police officer who is retired for disability once the
officer reached the age for longevity retirement, the court concluded that the primary purpose of benefits after retirement is
to provide for the support of the police officer and his family,
not to compensate him for loss of earnings resulting from disability. The court also held that the trial court erred in terminating spousal support at a certain date without reserving jurisdiction over the matter.
Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 96 Cal. App. 3d
1005, 158 Cal. Rptr. 470 (2d Dist. 1979). The trial court granted
summ~ judgment to defendant when a widow of a former police officer brought an action to compel payment of a pension
under the terms of the city charter. Her husband had taken disability retirement after nineteen years of service in the police
department. She had married his almost two years before he
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died from non-service causes and almost seven years after he began to collect retirement pay. She sought benefits under provisions of the charter providing that an annual pension of forty
percent of the highest salary will be paid to the widow of any
member of the police department who has served five years or
more and dies from causes other than those arising from the
performance of his duties. To be eligible, the widow must be
married to the member at least one year prior to his death. The
court of appeal reversed with directions to enter judgment for
the plaintiff. Rejecting defendant's argument that the term "any
member" should be construed as limited to persons in active service, the court held that the plaintiff satisfied all of the requirements of a literal reading of the city charter and was therefore
eligible for t1;le pension.

3. Classification of Benefits as Separate or Community
Property

t In re Marriage of Milhan, 97 Cal. App. 3d 41, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 523 (2d Dist. 1979), hearing granted, Nov. 15, 1979. In a
dissolution proceeding, the trial court ordered community division of the husband's retirement pay and of the case surrender
value of two military life insurance policies, and awarded the
wife attorney's fees. The judgment was entered pursuant to a
decision of the California Supreme Court which had reversed the
trial court's earlier adjudication, In re Marriage of Milhan, 13
Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert. den.,
421 U.S. 976 (1975), that these assets were the husband's separate property. The court of appeal reversed, noting that a recent
United States Supreme Court decision (Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979» was controlling. The appellate
court held that military retirement pay, being non attachable
under the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, remains the
separate property of the former serviceman to whom it is payable. The court noted that while special legislation was enacted to
permit garnishment of a civil servant's retirement benefits for
t Because the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the
court of appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any principle of law. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing
Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This case appears in the Survey
for the sole purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the
high court.
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community property purposes, no comparable provision allows
such garnishment of a former serviceman's pay. The court also
held that the trial court's award of half the cash value of the
military life insurance policies to the wife would effectively nullify the beneficiary election given to insured servicemen by Congress. Finally, the court ruled that because the husband's contentions were upheld in full, the trial court's award of attorney's
fees to the wife was erroneous.

In re Marriage of Lionberger, 97 Cal. App. 3d 56, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 535 (2d Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial
court entered an interlocutory judgment providing that 1)
spousal support to the wife should terminate after five years,
and 2) the interest of the husband in a union pension was community property. On appeal by the wife and the pension trust,
the court of appeal modified the judgment insofar as it declared
the wife's interest in the pension to be alienable, inheritable and
assignable. The court held that the termination of spousal support after five years was binding; the wife's failure to object at
the time the trial court included the provision in the interlocutory decree amounted to an implied waiver of her right to raise
that contention on appeal. The fact that the wife objected to the
provision in an attorney's conference in chambers was irrelevant
since there was no record of the conference. The court rejected
the trust's contention that the provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted state law
and precluded the application of California community property
law to the distribution of benefits, finding that the nature of the
action fell within the exception of ERISA and conferred concurrent jurisdiction on the state. U.S. Appeal Pending.
In re Marriage of Orr, 95 Cal. App. 3d 561, 157 Cal. Rptr.
301 (2d Dist.), hearing denied, Oct. 11, 1979. In a dissolution
proceeding, the court of appeal affirmed a trial court ruling that
Veterans Administration disability compensation was the hus~
band's separ~te property. The court held that Congress made
veterans' disability benefits free from community property
claims of spouses by 1) protecting those benefits by the antiattachment provisions of the Veterans Benefits Act (38 U.S.C.
section 3101), 2) providing that attachment is not allowed for
child and spousal support against payments made by the Veterans Administration as compensation for service-connected disa-
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bility, at least when the disability payments wholly displace re-'
tirement pay (52 U.S.C. section 662 subdivision (f)(2), and (3»
specifically excluding any community property division from the
definition of alimony (42 U.S.C. section 662(c». Under the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, California's
community property law must defer to the specific provisions in
the Veterans Benefits Act designed to protect those benefits.
The court also held that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to award the wife spousal support and in terminating jurisdiction over the case since the husband was totally
disabled and the wife was gainfully employed.

In re Marriage of Forrest, 97 Cal. App. 3d 850, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 229 (4th Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial
court entered an interlocutory judgment awarding the wife a
community property interest in her husband's military retirement pension, and denying the husband a community share in
his wife's right to reinstate her federal civil service retirement
benefits. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the wife's
pension asset was not only not vested but also nonexistent, subject to reinstatement only if she resumed employment with the
federal government and redeposited some $6,500.00 of withdrawn contributions. The wife had withdrawn the contributions
during her mm'riage and presumably used them for community
purposes. The community, therefore, had not been depleted as
would be the case if she had been contributing all along to a
nonvested pension. The court held that her present contributions were from separate property and that the trial court properly refused to divide so tenuous an asset. The court further
held that the husband's military retirement benefits were community property.
4. Rights of Divorced Spouse to Division of ERISA Pension
In re Marriage of Pilatti, 96 Cal. App. 3d 63, 157 Cal. Rptr.
594 (4th Dist. 1979), modified, 96. Cal. App. 3d 626e, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 594, cert. denied sub nom, Trustees of Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Pilatti, 100 S. Ct. 1276 (1980). In a dissolution proceeding, the wife joined the trustees of her husband's
pension trust as third party. The trial court' ordered the trustees
to pay one half the husband's retirement benefits directly to the
wife. The trust came under the Federal Employee Retirement
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Income Security Act (ERISA), under which benefits may be paid
only to participants or, upon death, to the surviving spouse, designated beneficiary, or estate. The trustees appealed. The court
of appeal affirmed, holding that 1) ERISA gives state courts concurrent jurisdiction in actions to enforce· a participant's rights
under the plan, and 2) the wife was an owner of her share of the
benefits under community property status and thus was a "participant" in the pension by the operation of law.

5. Retirement Benefits Omitted From Dissolution Decree
In re Marriage of Snyder, 95 Cal. App. 3d 636, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 196 (4th Dist. 1979). Plaintiff's complaint sought a onehalf interest in her ex-husband's retirement benefits, which were
vested and matured at the time the final judgment of dissolution
was entered. The trial court sustained a husband's demurrer,
without leave to amend, on the basis of res judicata. The court
of appeal reversed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be based on reference or surmise. At an uncontested hearing,
the parties omitted reference to retirement benefits in their
pleadings and stipulated that all community property had been
listed. The trial court was thus precluded from performing its
duty to divide the community retirement benefits, and the doctrine of res judicata would not apply.
6. Calculation of Community Interest in Retirement Benefits
In re Marriage of Poppe, 97 Cal. App. 3d 1, 158 Cal. Rptr.
500 (4th Dist. 1979). The trial court: 1) denied the request of a
former husband that spousal support for his wife be decreased
or terminated; and 2) granted the wife a modification of the
prior dissolution judgment by fixing her interest in the husband's Naval Reserve pension on the basis of the time rule (onehalf the ratio between number of years of service during marriage to the number of total qualifying years). The court of appeal reversed the lower court as to the extent of the wife's interest in the pension, but affirmed in all other respects. The court
held that the apportionment of retirement benefits on the basis
of the time rule was appropriate only where the amount of benefits was substantially related to the number of years of service.
The Naval Reserve pension is calculated on a point system-one
point for each drill while a reserve, and one point for each day
on active duty. The husband served nine years on active duty
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prior to marriage, and twenty-seven years in the reserve during
marriage. While only one-third of the total points were earned
during the marl'iage, by using time rule calculations, the community interest in the pension amounted to almost nine-tenths.
Since no substantial relationship existed between benefits and
length of service, the trial court abused its discretion in using
the time rule for its calculations.
I.

PATERNITY ACTIONS

1. Effect 0/ Failure to Dispute Paternity in Dissolution
Proceedings
In re Marriage 0/ Guardino, 95 Cal. App. 3d 77, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1st lDist. 1979). The trial court granted a husband's
motion to set aside portions of a dissolution judgment declaring
him to be the father of his former wife's child, and ordering him
.to pay child support. His motion was based on an allegation that
his wife had fraudulently led him to believe he was the child's
legal father. The trial court found that the husband' attorney in
the dissolution failed to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the birth of the child and failed to inform him that the
child was concllusively presumed to be the issue of his wife's
prior marriage. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the
trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the contested
portions of the judgment since the husband was aware that his
former wife was married to another man when she became pregnant and that she was having sexual relations with both men
during" the conception period. Therefore, the failure of his attorney to inform the husband that the child was conclusively presumed to be the issue of the prior marriage was not a proper
ground on which to set aside the judgment. The court further
held that the issue of paternity decided in the interlocutory decree, was res judicata.
Brown v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 633, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 604 (1st Dist. 1979). In a proceeding by a wife for increased child support, her ex-husband defended on the ground
that he was not the father of the child. The trial court ruled in
his favor, rejecting the wife's contention that the prior divorce
decree was res judicata on the paternity issue. The trial court
also granted the ex-husband's motion for a blood test of his exwife and the child, and to depose the child. The husband stated
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that he did not try to establish lack of paternity at the original
poceeding ten years before on his attorney's advice that it would
be too difficult to prove. The court of appeal directed the trial
court to vacate its order and to enter an order granting the exwife's motion to quash the deposition of the child. The court
held that the paternity determination in the default divorce decree was res judicata in the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake
and that the ex-husband had shown no evidence of such
circumstances.

2. Constitutionality of Paternity Agreement Statute
County of Ventura v. Castro, 93 Cal. App. 3d 462, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 66 (2d Dist. 1979). In accordance with an agreement between the district attorney and defendant, the trial court entered judgment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1 which authorizes judgment establishing paternity
and order of child support. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment. The court of appeal
reversed holding that Welfare and Institutions Code section
11476.1 is constitutionally defective in that 1) it makes no provision for the protection of the non-custodial parent's due process
rights to notice and hearing, 2) it fails to address the manner in
which a defendant can waive his rights to a hearing and 3) it
makes no provision for a prejudgment judicial determination on
the issue of waiver. A judgment entered accordingly might deprive a defendant of his personal property and, subsequently,
his freedom. The court saw no distinction between the confession of judgments statutes (Code of Civil Procedure sections
1132-1134, struck down by the supreme court on due process
grounds) and the agreement for judgment statute embodied in
Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1.
3. Representation of Indigent Male in Paternity Action
Littlefield v. Superior Court, 98 Cap. App. 3d 652, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 175 (2d Dist. 1979). The trial court appointed the public
defender to represent an indigent man in an action by the
county seeking to establish paternity of and support for two minor children. The court of appeal ordered the trial court to vacate its order of appointment, holding that the court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction. Government Code section 27706 sets
forth the authorized duties of the county public defender who is
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empowered to act in a limited number of narrowly defined civil
actions. An action to establish paternity and enforce child support is not one of those actions.

4. Appointment of Guardian m
Action

County Reimbursement

D.G. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 535, 161 Cal. Rptr.
117 (4th Dist. 1980). The trial court denied a mother's motion to
have herself appointed guardian ad litem for her minor child
rather than the court-appointed guardian. The child had been
named as plaintiff in an action by the county to establish paternity, for child support and to obtain ,reimbursement of welfare
funds expended on the child's behalf. The mother sought a writ
of mandate to compel the trial court to grarit her motion for
substitution and the court of appeal denied the writ. Following
petition to the Supreme Court, the matter was remanded to the
court of appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ. Subsequently, the court of appeal denied the mother's petition,
holding that although the district attorney appointed the guardian ad litem pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act (Civil Code
§ 7008), which potentially broadened the scope of the proceedings, the county's complaint asked for no more than was proper
within the context of an action for reimbursement of welfare
funds and to establish paternity under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 11350.1. The trial court, therefore, rightfully.
treated the appointment of the guardian ad litem as having been
made pursuant to the general authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which permits the appointment of a guardian
ad litem by the trial court whenever expedient. As to the substantive issues, the court held that 1) the mother failed to establish that the present guardian ad litem was not properly discharging his duties or had a conflict of interest, and 2) there was
no established preference to have the mother serve as guardian
ad litem.
J.

MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS

1. Imputed Negligence of Cohabiting Partner
Planck v. Hartung, 98 Cal. App. 3d 838, 159 Cal. Rptr. 673
(3d Dist. 1979). The trial court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that the negligence of a man could be imputed to the woman he
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lived with. The plaintiff based his allegation on the ground that
the man and woman, by living together, were engaged in a joint
venture and that the negligence of one could be imputed to the
other. The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that there was
nothing in the case to suggest any business purpose, profit motive or tangible benefit to the couple from their living arrangement other than that which was typical of all families; therefore,
the relationship did not become a joint venture for purposes of
vicarious or imputed liability.

2. Application of Marital Communications Privilege
People v. Delph, 94 Cal. App. 3d 411, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422 (2d
Dist. 1979). The trial court allowed a woman, with whom defendant had lived for four years and with whom she had had a
child, to testify that the defendant had made statements to her
regarding bomb threats. The court of appeal affirmed, holding
that the trial court was correct in refusing to apply the marital
communications privilege with respect to the woman's testimony. The court stated that a valid marriage is a prerequisite to
the exercise of the privilege and that it is for the legislature to
determine whether meretricious relationships deserve the same
statutory protection.
K.

LEGISLATION

1. Marriage and Dissolution

A.B. 537 - Waters
Chapter 164
Statutes of 1979
Dissolution. Allows final judgment of marriage to be filed
even if appeal or motion for new trial has been filed absent specified objection in the notice of appeal or motion for new trial.
A.B. 746 - McVittie
Chapter 621
Statutes of 1979
Marriage. Authorizes the court· to impose a fee to cover
counselling costs for persons under the age of eighteen who are
participating in pre-material counseling provided by the county.
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2. Community Property
A.B. 1826 - Kapiloff
Chapter 638
Statutes of 1979
Personal Injury Damages. Designates money received in
settlement of an accident or injury as separate property if the
accident or injury occurred after separation of the spouses.

3. Child Custody and Control
A.B. 363 - Chappie
Chapter 69
Statutes of 1979
Child Support Offsets. Allows Social Security payments to
be credited toward amount of child support ordered by the
court.
A.B. 381 - Boatwright
Chapter 11.70
Statutes of 1979
Child 0/ Prior Marriage. Requires all the community property interest of an adoptive parent or natural parent to be available for child support of a child by a prior marriage. Makes
other changes iin welfare laws.
A.B. 1480 - Imbrecht
Chapter 915
Statutes of 1979
Joint Custody Provisions: Specifies circumstances in which
a presumption favoring joint custody shall operate, and provides
that access to records and information pertaining to a minor
child may not be denied a parent because she is .not the child's
custodial parent.
S.B. 477 - Smith
Chapter 204
Statutes of 1979
Joint Custody Authorized. Specifies the circumstances in
which joint custody would be in the best interest of the child
and specifically authorizes· such an award of joint custody in
other cases as designated by the court.
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S.B. 540 - Presley
Chapter 752
Statutes of 1979
Consent to Adoption. Requires consent of natural father
where adoption of a child is being considered; clarifies who can
be considered as a natural father in paternity questions.

4. Spousal Support
A.B. 437 - McAlister
Chapter 912
Statutes of 1979
Unemployed Spouse. Requires the courts, in awarding
spousal support, to consider the extent to which the spouse's
earning capacity was impaired by periods of unemployment
during marriage because of domestic duties.

5. Pregnancy and Childbirth
A.B. 121 - Berman
Chapter 13
Statutes of 1979
Discrimination Based on Pregnancy. Makes technical
changes in laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of childbirth, pregnancy or related medical conditions.
A.B. 873 - Agnos
Chapter 657
Statutes of 1979
Genetic Disease Testing. Provides for an ongoing appropriation for Genetic Disease Testing Unit in the Department of
Health.
A.B. 1097 - Rosenthal
Chapter 629
Statutes of 1979
Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders. Requires that
health insurers offer coverage of genetic testing in cases of high
risk pregnancies, and requires that group policies offer coverage
on terms agreed upon by insurer and group policy holder. Also
requires prospective policy holders to be informed of coverage
availability.
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S.B. 775 - Keene
Chapter 1141
Statutes of 1979
Perinatal Care. Establishes regional perinatal transport systems for high risk pregnant women and infants and appropriates
$921,000 for the program which is to run until January 1, 1985.
S.B. 776 - Keene
Chapter 331
Statutes of 1979
Perinatal Program. Requires the Department of Health
Services to maintain a program addressing the special needs of
high risk pregnant women and infants particularly in underserved geographic areas.

m.
A.

LABOR LAW
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1. Recovery oj' Back Wages for Equal Pay Violation

t Jones v. Tracy School District, 93 Cal. App. 3d 552, 155
Cal. Rptr. 804 (3d Dist. 1979), hearing granted, July 25, 1979. In
an action by an employee for back pay under Labor Code section 1197.5 which requires equal pay for equal work without regard to the ser. of the employee, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion fol' summary judgment but limited recovery of back
wages to a two-year period prior to commencement of the action.
Plaintiff had sought recovery of back wages for the entire sixyear period during which she was underpaid solely because she
was a woman. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that in an
action for back pay, a new cause of action accrues with each discriminatory pay day, and the statute of limitations begins to run
from that time. Thus, the court held that the two-year period of
limitation contained in Labor Code section 1197.5(h) limited recovery to the difference in wages paid within two years of commencement of the action. Further, the court held that an award
t Because the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the
court of appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any principle of law. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing
Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This case appears in the Survey
for the sole purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the
high court.
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of attorney's fees under Labor Code section 1197.5(g) is discretionary in the trial court and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plaintiff's request for attorney's fees.

2. Constitutionality of Affirmative Action Program for Public
Employees
Minnick v. Department of Corrections, 95 Cal. App. 3d 506,
157 Cal. Rptr. 260 (lst Dist. 1979), modified on denial of rehearing, 96 Cal. 3d 626a, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980) (No.
79-1213, 1979 Term). The trial court granted a declaratory judgment in favor of two male Caucasians who had brought an action against the Department of Corrections and the Correctional
Officers Association alleging that the defendants had discriminated against employees of the department by carrying out an
affirmative action program. The trial court also issued a permanent injunction restraining, with qualification, hiring or promotion based on preference by race of sex. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the department's practices were permissible
under both the federal and state equal" protection clause to the
extent that noncontrolling preferences resulted in some advantage to women and minorities because such practices were necessary to promote the compelling interest of the state in the
proper management of its correctional system.
B.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS

1. Permissibility of Questions Regarding Pregnancy in Determining Eligibility.
Gunn v. Employment Development Department, 94 Cal.
App. 3d 658, 156 Cal. Reptr. 584 (2d Dist. 1979). The trial court
denied a woman's petition for writ of mandate to direct the Employment Development Board and the Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board to set aside their decision that she was ineligible
for unemployment insurance benefits because she refused to answer an interviewer's questions regarding her health and her
possible pregnancy. The court of appeal reversed and held that
an inquiry into the potential effect of pregnancy on a claimant's
health is constitutionally permissible only if conducted in the
least intrusive manner possible. At the time of her hearing, the
claimant provided the judge with a certificate of good health
from her physician, but refused to answer any questions about
her physical condition. The court of appeal stated that the cer-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

51

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 14

1338 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.10:1287

tificate from the woman's physician constituted prima facie
proof that she Vias eligible for benefits, and further questions regarding her pregnancy and health were an unwarranted invasion
of privacy.
C.

LEGISLATION

1.

Employment Discrimination

A.B. 740 - Chacon
Chapter 997
Statutes of 1979
Unemployment Data. Authorizes the State Employment
Development Department to collect data on comparative unemployment rates among various age, sex, and ethnic groups and
on the length of time and types of unemployment experienced
by the above-named groups.
S.B. 213 - Greene
Chapter 1181
Statutes of 1979
Jailers. Prohibits sex discimination in appointments or
work assignments in county jails.

2.

Wages, Hours and Benefits

A.B. 58 - Robinson
Chapter 76
Statutes of 1979
Worker's Compensation: Volunteers. Broadens the exclusion of volunteers from workers' compensation to exclude volunteers in all nonprofit organizations and redefines volunteer service for workers' compensation eligibility.
A.B. 105 - Fenton
Chapter 222
Statutes of 1979
Discontinuance of Health Benefits. Requires public and
private employers to give covered employees fifteen days written
notice of discontinuance of medical, surgical or hospital benefits.
S.B. 371 - Mills
Chapter 751
Statutes of 1979
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Leisure Sharing. Establishes an experimental "leisure
sharing" employment program whereby employees are allowed
to voluntarily cut back hours of work; federal funds are to be
sought for implementation.
3. Consideration of Volunteer Experience
A.B. 866 - Levine
Chapter 544
Statutes of 1979
Employment Applications. Requires all applications for
employment with the California State University and Colleges to
include a place to list volunteer experience, and for such experience to be considered if it is relevant to the job being applied
for; notice of consideration of volunteer experience must be displayed on the application form.
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